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Introduction: Human Rights as a Signpost in Turbulent Times
Finding ourselves within an increasingly confusing, chaotic world, we are faced with
these questions: “how to make sense of  the senseless? And how to craft a world
which recognizes and protects the inherent dignity and value of  human life?” Un-
derstood as a tool reflective of  the values of  its user, human rights language and
frameworks can be used in this project. 
The value of  human rights, like any tool, is in its application as well as the
motivation in its use. Human rights remain a relevant tool in crafting an increasingly
just, dignified world, motivated by empathy. This paper suggests points of  departure
for this venture, founded in consistent empathic reevaluation and action. These in-
clude: a shift away from legalist emphases and interpretations; the need to challenge
state primacy in human rights protections and promotions; the need to reconsider
the epistemologies and teleologies of  our existing state and supranational institu-
tions by historicizing them; and a demand to reexamine our understanding and ap-
plication of  property rights. Applications and understandings of  human rights must
recognize and value its complementarity with other ideas and frameworks, such as
antiracism, anti-imperialism, or the fight against growing inequity. Cooperation with
other frameworks requires an understanding of  human rights as complementary or
supplementary, rather than supercessionary. Lastly, empathic uses of  human rights
demand a re-centering of  the human in human rights practice, in terms of  bench-
marking, funding and evaluation.
Human Rights, Empathic Equality and Dynamism
In considering the relationship between human rights and equality, we must first
conceive of  human rights as a tool. Like any other technology, human rights exist
in our heads, not our hands; it is not a neutral concept but rather a device that—in
its conception and uses—mirrors the values of  the user.1 A political project aiming
to imagine, realize, and refine a more just and equal world requires intellectual hon-
esty, while continuing to prioritize efficacy. It should be recognized that human
rights are not the sole instrument of  progress, and as Samuel Moyn claims, alterna-
tive schemes could be superior.2 Viewing human rights as a tool rather than a dogma
allows for complementarity with other frameworks, as opposed to competition.
Therefore, the relationship of  human rights to equality is dynamic and changing,
according to whomever wields it. 
To further foster the gains and potential of  a pragmatic human rights proj-
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ect, intellectual flexibility, criticism, and dynamism are needed, particularly in our
present age of  urgency marked by the global rise of  reactionary populism.3 Mean-
ingful resistance requires a movement rooted in intellectual humility, empathy, and
reflexivity.4 Chief  among these tenets is empathy, recognized by historian Lynn
Hunt as an idea and practice with both “physical as well as emotional dimensions.”
Moreover, Hunt highlights empathy as a key component to the equitable realization
of  human rights.5
Accordingly, “[e]mpathy depends on the recognition that others feel and
think as we do, that our inner feelings are alike in some fundamental fashion.” For
Hunt this is wrapped in autonomy: to empathize is to recognize in others an equal
capacity for emotional and cognitive selfhood.6 Hunt is largely correct, though to
be considered empathic, practice ought to be genuine rather than applied towards
financial, personal, or any interest beyond intrinsic decency and consideration for
others and their well-being. Moreover, if  humans are autonomous and thus capable
of  creating alternative or new existences for themselves and their communities, em-
pathy and the crafting of  empathic institutions requires vigorous and consistent ac-
tion.
This necessitates that human rights communities—those committed to,
guided by, or employing a human rights-centred ethic or framework—work to avert
stasis. Stasis may be prevented through the application of  a dynamism inherent in
the ethic of  “negation and transformation,” or the continued reexamination and
recreation of  our norms, which, as Hunt notes, is intrinsic to the “human rights
revolution” itself. 7 This consistent reevaluation is ontologically, teleologically, and
epistemologically vital in order to problematize and remedy dislocations between
human rights and equality. 
Human rights may be losing currency in many communities because those
working in professionalized or institutionalized human rights contexts often em-
phasize legal frameworks, while ignoring structural inequities that facilitate viola-
tions.8 Human rights has been under-utilized outside of  law, partially due to being
too rigidly applied in the legal realm; this creates a perception of  human rights as
strictly a legal tool. The situation demands that human rights communities reflex-
ively shift from insularity towards both introspection and an expansion of  concern
related to the engines of  injustice. It should also be understood that, similar to
Amartya Sen’s conceptualization of  justice, the search for equality is driven less by
theoretical appeal than by a perception of  a bankruptcy of, or an affront to, some-
thing intrinsic; expressing itself  as a sense or feeling of  inequality.9 In this way,
(in)equality is ever-changing. Sen’s capabilities approach extends to the realm of  equality
as both opportunity and the process of  choice are person-dependent, while reflected
in the lived experiences resulting from structural exclusion.10 The shifting, dynamic,
and perceptional nature of  equality means that it must have a basis in (pragmatic)
empathic extensions.11 Accordingly, it is time to reconsider the ways in which state
power has been shaped by the colonial experience. States are the primary protector
Towards an Empathic Human Rights 91
(and often violator) of  rights, and are also capable of  misusing at best, coopting at
worst, the language of  human rights. A similar analysis is needed for human rights
mechanisms. Moreover, current ascriptions of  human rights responsibilities must
be reconsidered, along with the origins and uses of  property rights and its engage-
ment with equality.  
The Contemporary Character of  Human Rights and the Judiciary
It is vital to understand why some human rights institutions and experts emphasize
legal frameworks, at the peril of  neglecting structural inequity.12 Disproportionate
institutional ties between human rights and legality are a function of  the typology
of  both concepts. Both are conservative in their contemporary forms, insofar as
they seek to reform rather than transform existing structures. In law this is reflected
by the assertion that “in a changing society law should march in tune with the
changed ideas and ideologies,” perhaps best evinced in criminal law wherein
“[m]ethods of  providing remedies have undergone tremendous change with the
growth of  electronic commerce, cyber crime and internet.”13 The tempo of  law is
marked by evolution as opposed to revolution; changes are made to reflect rather
than lead change, and in liberal democracies this is the appropriate function of  the
judiciary. Samuel Moyn makes the compelling argument that contemporary human
rights culture was birthed in the 1970s out of  disillusionment with utopian projects
such as the welfare state, and the failures of  postcolonial politics.14 This reformative
conception of  human rights was expressed in the Universal Declaration of  Human
Rights, as well as the Carter administration’s use of  human rights in foreign policy.15
Mainstream human rights has been widely used to reform power for good, but is
perhaps lacking as a challenge to the existence or legitimacy of  power, especially
the primacy of  state power.
Historicizing the Human Through a Racial Lens
The object of  human rights protections—the human—must be reevaluated prior
to assessing its relationship to the state. With very few formal colonies remaining,
the present offers an excellent opportunity to develop an honest universal vision
of  human rights.16 While the International Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of
Racial Discrimination aptly states “any doctrine of  superiority based on racial differ-
entiation is scientifically false,” this only goes part of  the way in the twenty-first
century.17 While this treaty states that race as a category has been disproven, it does
not recognize that race as a manufactured difference was mandated by the colonial
project; in this sense it does not historicize race.18 While the international community
has acknowledged the falsity of  racial logic underpinning white supremacy, it re-
mains incumbent to address the moral damage resulting from colonialism; this re-
making of  humanity is both necessary for the beneficiaries of  oppression as well
as the marginalized.19 The restoration of  what Paul Gilroy frames as “infrahu-
mans”—those previously deemed disposable—is in a Hegelian sense20 a project of
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great urgency to the valuation of  all lives; until the humanity of  the most margin-
alized is fully acknowledged and restored, the inherent dignity of  all lives cannot
fully be recognized.21 Collective ownership of  wrongdoing and correction is part
of  working towards meaningful equality and prosperity. Historicizing injustice is
necessary to build the empathic connections Jeremy Rifkin claims are required for
equality and indeed, the realization of  human rights for all.22 In order to transform
our institutions towards equality they must first reflect an identification with the
struggles of  others (especially the marginalized) thus understanding the makings
and continuations of  systemic exclusion is vital. A lack of  empathy is accompanied
by totalitarian tendencies; institutions reflect a community’s values, and thus inclu-
sion must be prioritized.23
Human rights should seek reinforcement and complementarity with other
frameworks—chiefly antiracism. Gilroy correctly asserts that antiracists “are certain
of  what we are against but cannot say what we are for with the same degree of  clarity
and conviction,” while current efforts lack the possibility to envision race’s “un-
making, its deconstruction, its transcendence, or even the possibility to imagine its
eventual descent into irrelevance.”24 To this extent, human rights and its existing
legal frameworks can play an aspirational role. It is important to recognize the con-
tinued power of  race in the contemporary era without a resignation to its ontology.
The challenge is to both acknowledge the existence of  a contemporary structural
issue while crafting a world beyond it. 
Aspirational components of  supranational human rights documents serve
to recognize current problems and outlaw violations (as treaties do), while envi-
sioning a new world. However, such documents must acknowledge and correctly
frame the ascendance of  systemic violations, in order to meaningfully challenge the
basis for violations (in this case racial discrimination). Instilling antiracist scholarship,
specifically that surrounding the historical construction and experience of  oppres-
sion, into such documents will meaningfully and ambitiously challenge the very on-
tology and permanence of  race. Conversely, omitting this component reifies and
stabilizes race as a category and unit of  analysis as well as a unit of  social organiza-
tion. Recognizing the manufactured nature of  difference implicitly imagines a world
wherein that difference (and thus the justification for violation) can be un-made.
Moreover, such efforts would further increase perceptions of  human rights as an
engine of  justice, fighting views shaped by the misuse of  human rights language by
violators.
The inception of  human rights must be historically problematized, par-
ticularly one narrative of  the concept/community/theme arising out of  a consensus
resulting from the horrors of  the Second World War.25 If  one conceives of  that
war as colonialism returning home—as both Fanon and Césaire did—the implica-
tion is that the horrors of  colonialism in Europe warranted the birth of  a new idea
and instrument (in this narrative human rights is inextricably linked to the United
Nations) while suffering elsewhere was of  little concern.26 The implications of  this
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are threefold: the humans whose rights and dignity are worth protecting are very
specific; the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights may not be that universal, as it did
not include the voices of  the colonized; and the self-determination conceived of  at
the time was by and for colonial powers (or at least independent countries), thus rel-
egating human rights to a “consolation prize” of  sorts—a governance structure for
the subjected perhaps not that different from laws governing the treatment of
slaves.27 Additionally, a possible relationship between the rise of  the UDHR out of
the butchery of  the Second World War, an elevation of  “anti-Semitism [as] the mas-
ter narrative for an understanding of  racial politics” and the probationary whiteness
or European-ness attained by American Jews and the Israeli state in the postwar
period may be fertile ground for future scholarly inquiry, though it does not fit the
purview of  this piece.28
An empathic reevaluation and action of  redress regarding the history of
the UDHR requires “reworking material from the past while facing the present.”29
In this vein, the Declaration ought to recognize and rectify the exclusion of  the
world’s colonized population. While initiating a formal human right against colonial
relations or occupation may be challenging, as the right to self-determination already
falls under this general purview, the inclusion of  colonialism as a crime against hu-
manity may be more appropriate as it demands reparatory action. This is particularly
important as the categorization or concept has origins in the colonial period—the
phrase “crime against humanity” was first coined to describe colonial Congo. Ad-
ditionally, there is an extensive history of  framing liberation movements as simply
“crimes[s] against humanity,” though many understood and validated violence in
anticolonial struggle as a retrieval of  a right to self-determination denied.30 Under
contemporary understandings of  crimes against humanity, fascist crimes constitute
an offense towards the greater human family but the crimes of  colonial fascist
regimes do not, while resistance to such oppression is framed as inherently detri-
mental not only to humanity but “progress.” 31 The message is clear: European lives
matter, those of  the colonized world do not.
Some may resist the codification of  colonialism as a crime against human-
ity, as colonial relations are both public in nature and systemically ingrained into
the global economy, meaning that not only have social, political, and cultural rights
been violated, but economic ones as well. This would require not only reparations
for the past, but if  “[c]olonialism is not dead,” then restructuring present economic,
epistemological and political dynamics is necessary as well.32 Moreover, similar to
postracial arguments domestically, colonial relations are often problematized as
something solvable—as something we have (or ought to have) moved beyond and
for which common folks are not responsible. Or, colonial relations are culturally
embraced and justified through myriad amnesias, denialisms, and sentimentalisms.33
Another means to address legacies of  inequity and perceptions of  human
rights as an exclusionary concept is by seeking to reorient associated supranational
institutions such as the UN—in particular the Security Council. Accepting the prem-
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ise that states are representative of  their populaces, such privileged positions deem
specific groups more able to conceive of  and lead on human rights and other issues
facing the international community; this is nothing short of  an institutionalization
of  existing unequal power relations.
Redesigning our institutions along increasingly reflexive and historically
inclusionary lines constitutes a public empathic action. As empathy requires con-
sistency, reevaluation, and dynamism to match the ever-changing nature and tempo
of  modern life, such actions are both form and function of  an increasingly empathic
society; they reflect progress while encouraging or promoting further empathic im-
pulses and responses.34
Self-Infliction amidst Changing Societies
Unfortunately, the universality and thus credibility of  human rights faces attacks
from within its very structures. In sustaining the French government’s burqa ban,
the European Court of  Human Rights has only sustained notions of  human rights
as being Eurocentric and exclusionary.35 This is an instance wherein the Court mis-
used human rights as a tool, ruling that a concealed “face was tantamount to a bar-
rier against others, based on the importance of  the face in social interaction,” thus
taking a position that qualifies socialization and social interaction as universal in
form.36 Moreover, the Court found such concealment infringed on “the right of
others to live in a space of  socialization which makes living together easier.”37 The
Court clearly privileged mainstream society’s ostensible discomfort over meaningful
identity practice. As formalized racial discourse is losing social currency with the
collapse of  colonial boundaries, stratification is shifting towards a hierarchy of  ab-
solutism organized around culture; the colour line is transmuting into the cultural line.38
Accordingly, the burqa ban reflects not only the criminalization of  identity, but also
the superimposition of  cultural and moral boundaries onto human bodies; the burqa
wearer is the domestic contradiction conceived of  as an internal Clash of  Civilizations. 
The terms of  such conflict being foisted onto the wearer of  the burqa are
both gendered and inconsistent with liberalism’s emphasis on individual autonomy.
It is just as wrong to dictate that a woman dress-down, lest she bring discomfort upon
others, as it is to mandate she cover up so as to not tempt men. This ruling reifies
sexist tropes over female bodily autonomy, dictating that women ought to draw the
attention of  men while remaining sexually pure. In this case, the burqa wearer is
transformed from subject to object, constituting a highly illiberal attack on individual
agency and human dignity. Accordingly, the Court’s decision justifiably undermines
its own legitimacy as an authority on human rights.
In accepting the French government’s argument of  uniform social prac-
tice, cultural superiority, and divergence is emphasized, rather than points of  ac-
commodation and joint community. These distinctions are a legacy of  the colonial
project which should be analyzed and collapsed.39 Moreover, the empowerment and
protection of  minorities should transcend the legal form—a reliance on legal meas-
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ures serves to limit the political existence of  minorities to ways overtly protected
by the state.40 While seeking to integrate minorities, societies must seek to integrate
themselves as well; this requires actively constructing empathy.41 Accordingly, mi-
norities should not simply be seen as in society, but rather should be framed as part
of  the social fabric. Human rights communities must work to shed conceptions of
minorities that relegate them to victimhood as opposed to agency, a requirement in
crafting a joint political project towards a more empathic and thus equal paradigm. 
Lynn Hunt correctly identifies the role of  literature in developing empathy
for those previously excluded or invisible, and its relationship to the development
of  human rights.42 With this in mind, popular representation has meaningful effects
as to whom is considered worthy of  ostensibly universal protections. In an increas-
ingly diversified, globalized world, the promotion of  inclusive media both reflects
and promotes a more empathic reality. For instance, some observers have hailed the
film Black Panther as heralding a cinematic resistance to inequitable global affairs
and an attack on white supremacy and patriarchy; the autonomy (a requirement in
empathy) of  people of  colour is both recognized and promoted in cinema.43
Whether this film is successful in promoting integration and greater empathy is up
for debate, though it is clear that greater integration and respect for human rights
is fueled or supported by an increasingly diversified popular culture.44 Continued
reliance on the judiciary requires an active, holistic transformation of  society in
which the courts will theoretically reflect at a later time. Unfortunately, progress is
rarely linear, nor guaranteed.45
Postcolonial Re-Imaginations and Legacies in the Modern State
If  we accept Hannah Arendt’s proposition that human rights are chiefly protected
by states, then citizenship and nationality conceptually function to distinguish cul-
tivated personhood from savagery.46 In this vein it is vital to reconsider and examine
the relationships of  equality and human rights to state processes. Understanding
the functions of  the modern state requires recognizing the ways in which it has
been shaped by modern history (especially when dealing with former colonial pow-
ers). One way to approach this is by returning to the colonial period. It is necessary
to reconfigure understandings of  this era—chiefly the relationship between the
metropole and the colony. Often this relationship is conceived of  as the metropole
conquering and shaping the colony. The paternalism of  this one-directional narra-
tive was put best by former French Prime Minister François Fillon’s insistence that
the colonial experience was just France’s way of  “sharing our culture.”47 In order
for human rights communities to adapt to the continuing challenges inherent in a
paradigm wherein state actors are supreme, this relationship must be reconsidered.
The colony (and thus the colonized) was not some vacuous space that was
acted upon without having consequences in the metropole, or without leaving im-
prints in our contemporary age, but rather served as a political laboratory for man-
ufacturing difference and experimentation in the exercise of  state power. Colonial
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staff  themselves often returned to Europe bringing back a new (or refined) set of
experiences and ideas. This is of  particular note in the field of  policy as the colony
was the proverbial ground zero for the construction (or extension) of  state power
and thus population management.48 Alfred W. McCoy demonstrates how the Amer-
ican occupation of  the Philippines shaped domestic security apparatuses, creating
processes that characterize overreaches revealed by the Snowden leaks.49 In a more
immediate sense, this phenomenon is reflected in the growth of  a counterinsur-
gency-industrial-complex resulting from the Israeli occupation of  Palestinian
lands—a situation Jeff  Halper refers to as “Global Gaza.”50 Accordingly, innova-
tions in population control tactics and devices derived from the occupation are ex-
ported to security forces across the globe.51
Currently, one of  the prevailing ideologies employed in the realm of  for-
eign policy is that of  neoconservatism. Elements of  neoconservatism such as pre-
emptive strikes, or the failure or lack of  wherewithal to differentiate between
combatants and civilians, not only violate basic conceptions of  a right to life and
fair trial, but reflect a desacralization of  the body. Gilroy posits this as a vestige of
colonial expansion, a period wherein colonial consolidation was fueled by a notion
“that the natives could be made to simply disappear.”52 Until the inherent equal
value of  all lives is recognized, said disposability of  life must make human rights
practitioners—or those employed in institutionalized human rights contexts—chal-
lenge fictions such as “clean war,” as opposed to accommodating or mitigating
them.53 Human rights communities must also denounce neoconservative conflations
of  human rights with national interests or western hegemony, both morally and
geopolitically, within a fundamentally inequitable capitalist order.54
Perversely, neoconservatives often coopt the language of  human rights in
justifying military adventurism. This is frequently accompanied by messianic pre-
sentations of  ontologically-unchallenged dualities of  good and evil, perhaps best em-
bodied in the purported duty to violently export market-driven democracy abroad.55
Human rights communities must denounce neoconservative misuse of  human
rights language; this misuse perpetuates injustice and generates disillusion with
human rights as a concept (and for good reason). It needs to be clear that such ide-
ology is incompatible with appropriate uses of  human rights. Perhaps neoconser-
vative appropriation may be traced to the years immediately following the Universal
Declaration of  Human Rights; as human rights were increasingly framed globally, they
were also mired in racism within western centres of  power, with many of  the world’s
peoples deemed “incapable of  democratic government.”56 Those denied autonomy
are denied empathy. 
Neoconservatism demonstrates its colonial underpinnings in the sanitiza-
tion of  violations. Anthropologist Talal Asad suggests that suffering resulting from
indiscriminate bombings (justified by the aforementioned indifference to civilians)
is conceived of  not as a human rights abuse but rather “collateral damage.”57 Aban-
doning language which minimizes or sanitizes suffering requires an internal rework-
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ing of  human rights as an idea, as well as a pairing of  human rights with other
frameworks such as linguistics or cultural studies. Further, human rights frameworks
have largely been successful in prioritizing and protecting abuses directed at indi-
viduals, but are weaker in facing collective or communal challenges.58 Asad highlights
this paradox insofar as cases of  state violence or torture against individual victims
is (correctly) framed as a human rights violation.59 The salience of  human rights in
individual violations as opposed to collective violations is further reflected in an ef-
fective storytelling centered around “depictions of  grievous abuse, rather than on
causal cogency”; flagrant, striking individual abuses are more readily opposed than
slow, grinding violations.60
Introspection is needed to understand if  the contradiction highlighted by
Asad is epistemologically grounded in nature, or if  human rights can innovate to-
wards expanding its scope. If  the former is true, human rights communities must
consider which intellectual systems complement human rights, issue by issue and
violation by violation. Both the language and the approaches to injustices must be
reconsidered through the lens of  empathic equality.61 This necessitates reconcep-
tualizing suffering’s proximity to the rest of  global society, and a shift from priva-
tizing the matter to making it a public concern, thus one of  collective responsibility.
Though antiracist sentiments lace pieces of  international human rights
legislation—most notably The International Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms
of  Racial Discrimination—such complementarity is incomplete, as is the basis of  a
mutual reinforcement between human rights and antiracism. This is largely due to
a dependency on legalism. Within this context, colonialism is (correctly) con-
demned, but neoconservatives are able to peddle an imperial agenda (doused in am-
nesia) while ostensibly adhering to the dictates of  human rights. Historian Brian
Drohan effectively demonstrates the ways in which, based on racial fictions, colonial
powers “established the legal framework within their colonies and could apply it
where they saw fit.” Like their predecessors, neoconservatives are able to speak and
hold the moral ground of  human rights language while promoting imperial proj-
ects—most notably through the application of  law towards military aims, or “law-
fare.”62 Legalism is neither neutral nor solely capable of  preventing relativistic uses
of  human rights. Nearly exclusive reliance upon legality enabled neoconservatives
to reinterpret and transform the ethics of  non-intervention along the lines of  ex-
ceptionalist sensibilities; an understanding of  non-intervention as the prevention of
human rights norms from blocking moral and military interventionism.63 Effective
antiracism is inseparable from anti-imperialism, as colonial relations are fraught with
human rights violations.64 Colonialism ought to be framed intellectually, morally,
and legally as a crime against humanity, while unjust neocolonial relations are un-
derstood as contributing to or perhaps constituting ongoing violations.
Returning to reconfiguring the relationship between the metropole and
the colony, economic matters must be investigated. As a testing ground, the colonies
were characterized by a greater segmentation of  daily life that is increasingly recog-
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nizable in the contemporary era, specifically in the realms of  spatial security and
the casualization of  labour.65 The former is reflected in the American context by
the racial anxieties underpinning “white flight” from the perceived dangers or bar-
barism of  the city to the safety or civility of  the suburbs. This migration achieved
not only spatial isolation, but also an inequality in terms of  human rights, including
access to quality education.66
Paul Gilroy notes that employment in the colonies for local peoples was
markedly insecure, largely in what we would now call the service industry.67 The
present incarnation of  those patterns are fueled globally through policies of  dereg-
ulation and privatization. These policies are designed to create—in the parlance of
neoliberalism—flexible labour markets; this is the proverbial chickens of  colonial
economic designs not simply coming home to roost, but rather globalizing the roost.
As a descendent of  colonial economies, neoliberalism continues to foster inequality,
attack the public sphere, and impede human rights—including those related to dem-
ocratic participation.68 This effect of  neoliberalism is not surprising as one of  its
precursors, the colonial economy, was predicated on the denial of  rights and hu-
manity of  the colonized. 
Samuel Moyn argues that tackling inequality stemming from neoliberalism
does not require replacing human rights as a guiding framework, but complementing
it with something else.69 The language of  human rights fused with Adolph Reed’s
notion of  “infrapolitics,” or the politics of  experience and daily lived resistance,
would help build meaningful political communities.70 The formality of  human
rights’ legalism as well as the ubiquitous nature of  “infrapolitics” are both needed
to fight structural inequality economically and in the workings of  the supreme actor
in the human rights realm: the state.
Falling Short Using a Self-Defeating Assignment of  Responsibility
Human rights communities must also adjust methods of  consideration in regard
to state responsibility. Typically, responsibilities to protect, fulfill, and respect human
rights are ascribed to a given individual’s state.71 The limit of  this arrangement is
that it obscures more powerful states’ and international institutions’ roles in foster-
ing local conditions wherein human rights obligations or standards cannot be met.
This is exemplified by International Monetary Fund policies facilitating direct for-
eign investment in dubious contexts, or most grievously by the American destabi-
lization of  Allende’s Chilean economy.72
Asad demonstrates the moral perversion of  the current assignment of  re-
sponsibility as “the suffering that the individual sustains as a citizen—as the national
of  a particular state—is distinguished from the suffering he undergoes as a human
being.” Clearly, Arendt was correct on the nationally-coded value of  rights and the
role of  the state, as well as the function of  citizenship in the protection of  rights.73
The ostensible universality of  human rights’ object of  protection and preserva-
tion—dignity—is addressed by and through the logic of  nationalities and the in-
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ternal workings of  the state, as inequities between states are ignored. Meaningful
understandings of  responsibility are obfuscated, self-criticism by hegemons is pre-
vented, and empathic connections beyond national borders are thwarted. This re-
sults in instances such as the failures to report on the Rwandan genocide or the
competing coverage and valuation of  Yemeni and Syrian suffering; leading Ameri-
can media only became attentive to Yemen’s civil war once American “interests
[were] at risk.”74 By its very nature, the current assignment of  responsibility under-
mines a “cosmopolitan commitment to human rights” predicated in common hu-
manity and duty to each other.75 Accordingly, the valuation of  human rights abuses
is framed not as universal, but dictated by which passport—if  any—the sufferer
holds.76
While it is important to continue to take states to task for local violations,
human rights communities must expand liability to all actors. This deals primarily
with a practical concern: (economic) hegemony should not come with invisibility
of  responsibility. Human rights practitioners must identify powerful actors external
to the national boundaries of  violation, and lobby for changes to policy. To build
momentum for such efforts, it is imperative to trans-nationalize both violations and
resistance. This enables an exchange of  tactics, ideas, and solidarity. For instance,
the recent human rights abuses alleged at Standing Rock are not insulated within
the Dakotas; banks are globally invested and can successfully be pressured to di-
vest.77 In this case, human rights can be utilized in conjunction with a Marxist un-
derstanding of  the mobility of  capital to take meaningful action, fueled by an
empathic impulse. 
Nocuous Origins and Uses of  Property Rights
Human rights actors must challenge many invocations of  property rights through
a renewed exploration of  the origins of  property rights as an idea. Property rights
have been used to justify slavery, with liberty itself  being conceived of  as a property
with the capacity to be commodified. This was largely due to a linkage between ob-
ligation and right, and a corollary capacity to comprehend punishment.78 While this
rationale has been abused, it does have some intellectual value and should be revis-
ited in challenging “legal persons”—for instance, corporations—making human
rights claims, which delegitimizes both human rights and dignity. Accordingly, legal
persons lack human faculties and meaningful comprehension and personalization,
as well as any comprehension of  consequence and responsibility. Deprivation of
human liberty has visceral, individual effects; this is not the case with socially-con-
structed entities.
Unlike corporations, human have emotive capacities, such as the capacity
to feel empathy, motivate senses, and conceive of  and act upon responsibility.79
Lacking this competency, or the endowment of  emotion, “corporate social respon-
sibility” (CSR) is merely a tool to humanize the unhuman while skirting social ac-
countability. Legal scholar Reuven S. Avi Yonah argues that by the logic of  CSR,
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attempts to avoid or minimize corporate taxation should be anathema to its propo-
nents and counter to its application, as taxation is a foundational social responsibil-
ity.80 Perhaps we ought to understand the poor track record of  CSR less as failures,
but rather as undertakings that are impossible or illogical, even if  well-intentioned.81
Lacking the emotive capacity for free will or for responsibility which is constitutive
to rights, capital requires greater oversight, accountability, and regulation, as we can-
not expect it to ethically correct itself. This is not by flaw but by design.82
Teleologically, corporations are meant to accumulate capital, and are inca-
pable of  developing empathy due to their amoral character; human existence cannot
be reduced to this.83 Property rights should be used to protect humans from dis-
possession, expropriation and the like; not in monopolistic efforts related to intel-
lectual property that can be harmful to human well-being. 84
By enabling nonhuman entities to lay claims to human rights through
property rights, not only are proponents of  frameworks otherwise compatible with
human rights alienated at an emotive or ethical level, but also at an intellectual level.
By institutionalizing property rights claims, proponents of  human rights have fur-
ther made capitalism the inevitable modus operandi; through property rights claims,
capitalism has its ontology stabilized. This follows hegemonic doctrines claiming
the free market’s seemingly organic nature. Such institutionalization is problematic,
given the decreasing faith in capitalism—especially amongst millennials—creating
the possibility for human rights to be conceived of  as useless at best, and a tool of
(rigged) capitalism at worst.85 Accordingly, the state’s provision of  property rights
to corporate power has allowed a cooptation of  Fela Kuti’s prophetic conception
of  human rights: 
Human rights na my property. 
So therefore, you can’t dash me my property. 
Human rights na my property. 
Dey wan dash us human rights
…
Botha na friend to Thatcher & Reagan
Botha na friend to some other leaders too
And together dem wan dash us human rights.86
In effect, the commodification of  human rights through corporate property rights
has largely dispossessed the concept of  its intrinsic good, making it a tool to further
rather than challenge power. Kuti’s concept of  human rights has perhaps been (at
least is viewed as having been) coopted by the powerful it initially threatened, leading
to contemporary adaptation of  language on other terms such as inequity.
Accepting Lenin’s conception of  imperialism as an outgrowth of  capital-
ism, the portrayal of  capitalist entities possessing selfhood which is attacked by at-
tempts to constrain accumulation is tantamount to human rights being used as
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ethical dressing.87 Again, similar to Drohan’s scholarship on lawfare, the violence
of  another capitalist creation, the human corporation, uses the language of  human
rights to manipulate legal norms in order to both cloak their role in abuses as well
as to preserve their power. The imbuement of  character, selfhood, and rights in
transnational corporations signals the retreat of  the imperial state and the rise of
consolidated capitalism. Like their predecessor, the imperial state, transnational cor-
porations are able to speak and benefit from the language of  human rights while
using legal, financial, and governance fictions to hide from meaningful accounta-
bility.88 Perversely, as corporations are protected by human rights, defenders of  such
rights for human beings face increased risks of  violent intimidation and assassina-
tion.89
Conclusion: Operationalized Empathy, Shared Challenges and Joint Paths
Forward
Many challenges remain for human rights, including its flagrant misuse, threats to
saliency both from within and without, reliance on state actors, and dubious aspects
in origin stories.90 These challenges reflect many issues facing global civil society
writ large: the loss of  faith in institutions which is fueling reactionary populism;
deep-rooted moral, institutional, and historical damage, resulting in structural ex-
clusion; limited scopes of  responsibility; and fractional conceptualizations of  the
person. The tasks of  reevaluation, repair, and renewal are impossible for human
rights communities to perform alone. Meaningful (and sometimes messy) cooper-
ation with previously competitive, antagonistic, or even apathetic ideological com-
munities will be necessary.91
Effective cooperation will stem from and reproduce the very basis of
equality and empathy, and this requires human rights communities to recognize their
guiding framework as complementary rather than necessarily superseding the mod-
els, language and ethics of  others. Empathic action requires understanding and re-
specting that others may have alternative languages or templates towards achieving
similar goals. To facilitate such cooperation, proponents of  human rights ought to
(re)assert empathy as a cornerstone to productive (and patient) dialogue and co-
constitutive action. In complementary capacities, appropriate human rights appli-
cation may continue to buffer extremist cultural relativism, insofar as empathy
informs intellectual and practical limitations while collapsing creative and inventive
barriers.
Operationalized empathy requires the recognition of  the competencies
and capacities that proponents of  interlocking or complementary frameworks have
to independently create, imagine, and enact. Successful collaboration necessitates
empathy in order to foment the trust necessary for successful coalitions and soli-
darity. In this vein, proponents of  human rights ought to actively listen to and en-
gage with proponents of  similar visions. Practically, this demands that institutions
promoting human rights shift away from a present privately characterized by an ac-
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tivist at a recent NGO Committee on the Status of  Women event as shaping local
needs around thematic international aims. 
In order to receive necessary funding, civil society must force their genuine
ambitions or needs, proverbially conceived of  as circular pegs, into the square hole
of  the sponsor’s agenda. Though the inequity of  this relationship is problematic,
in the interim, without large scale self-sustaining civil society, sponsoring organiza-
tions must reorient guiding agendas towards a paradigm governed by and for the
beneficiaries. Human rights achievements and their measurement must shift from
merely the technical or technocratic, towards a greater fusion with the experiential.
This may serve to reinvigorate the use of  human rights by social movements and
other organic forms of  resistance.92
Conceptually, we must veer away from increasingly professionalized, often
apolitical, neutral, or seemingly objective understandings and sensibilities surround-
ing human rights—particularly in regards to international institutions—to restore
the human in human rights.93 Human rights continue to be an excellent tool at our
disposal and will only increase in value with the hard work of  consistent and honest
introspection. Powering the battery of  human rights with honest sentiments and
expressions of  empathy supports meaningful and effective collaboration, delivers
great reason for hope, optimism, and a renewed belief  in the possible.
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